In the Face of a Receding Lake, Water Conflict at the Ethiopia-Kenya Border

Cross-linked with Bertelsmann Stiftung – Future Challenges Organization’s site

Lake Turkana. Credit: Wikimedia.org

In May 2012, the Kenyan government sent 200 additional reserve troops to the Kenya-Ethiopia border in response to Ethiopian militia attacks in the Turkana region. Tensions were high following the killing of a Kenyan police reservist at the hands of Ethiopian militiamen.

This occurs less than a year and a half after Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki and former (now-deceased) Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s May 2011 meeting in Uganda, where they decided to end border conflicts amicably. In addition to water conflicts, there is the conflict of claims over the Elemi Triangle, which is the northwestern corner of Lake Turkana, bordering South Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya.

As I previously addressed in an article entitled “Water Scarcity and Conflict at the Ethiopia-Kenya Border,” water shortages have been contributing to tribal clashes between the Kenyan Turkana and the Ethiopian Dassanech, Nyangatom and Mursi tribes.

In the Horn of Africa, where regional temperatures have risen 2 degrees Fahrenheit since 1960, and are projected to increase an additional 2-5 degrees by 2060, climate change is particularly salient. The effects of this climate change: increasing variability of rainfall,deforestation and land degradation are all occurring within the context of rapid population growth and limited land and water resources.

An estimated eight million semi-nomadic people in Southern Ethiopia and Northern Kenya depend on the waters of Lake Turkana for their livelihoods. Lake Turkana gets 90 percent of its water from the Omo River, but in recent years, the lake has been receding into Kenya.

The conflict is further exacerbated by the diversion of the Omo River’s flow to Ethiopia’s upstream dams (including Gilgel Gibe III), considered the largest hydro-power project south of the Sahara. While providing electricity to Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda and Yemen, the dams threaten the livelihoods of nearly a million nomadic, pastoral tribesmen.

The question at this point is, “are we going to see a repeat of previous events?” In the first week of May 2011, fighting at the Kenyan-Ethiopian border claimed 34 lives. This, in addition to what Steven Watson alluded to in his lead article “Liquid Asset”- the disincentivizing effect of food aid and the perceived price of water, makes it clear that the price of water is high. However, our attitudes toward water use often do not reflect this:

“The moment international agencies give out food, there’s no incentive for the local population to help themselves,” he says. “I worked for some time in the Turkana desert in Kenya where that was very evident. As long as somebody else gives out food there’s no reason to try and provide your own food. It’s a lot of work. Why should you work when you can get it for free? Or take for example the price of water; if water is expensive for you then you will try to use it as efficiently as you can and minimize losses. However if you get the water free as is the case in a very large number of developing countries then there’s no real incentive to use it efficiently.”

Furthermore, in the late 1970s, the Kenyan government’s policy of arming the Turkana was followed within a decade by the Ethiopian government’s arming of Dassanech tribesmen with

Forcible Resettlement and Land Grabs in Ethiopia

Cross-linked at Bertelsmann Stiftung – Future Challenges Organization’s Blog

Ethiopia is Africa’s biggest aid recipient, and one of Africa’s most food-insecure nations. Simultaneously, Ethiopia is one of most militarized nations on the continent, with a history of both internal and external uses of force.

More recently, the forcible resettlement of semi-nomadic groups in the western Gambella region has troubling implications for a nation with high rates of malnutrition and food insecurity, whose citizens overwhelmingly rely upon small-scale farming.

In Ethiopia, the average cost in USD for leasing a hectare for year ranged from $1.25 to $10 before 2009, increasing to $26-$42. While urbanization is changing the population makeup, land deals are still salient for the 83 percent of Ethiopians who are rural dwellers. The increased use of Ethiopian land for biofuel diverts land from food production which is especially important for a country that has consistently been Africa‘s biggest recipient of food aid.

As more Ethiopians become dependent upon the global food market, they also become more vulnerable to fluctuations in prices. Food prices in Ethiopia have recently shot up 50 percent, while the Ethiopian Birr has been devalued in light of the nation’s import-oriented economy. This is in addition to the fact that when food prices spiked in 2008, 6.4 million Ethiopians became dependent upon emergency food aid (this number had dropped to 4.9 million by 2009). Taken together, these factors pose a grave threat to the food security of a nation already dependent upon food aid.

While 10% or Ethiopia’s mostly-rural population (or 7.8 million) is dependent upon food aid, the government has forcibly resettled 70,000 semi-nomadic people (many of whom belong to the Nuer and Anuak tribal groups, the latter of which has faced a history of violence and discrimination in their ancestral homeland) in the western Gambella region as part of a “villagization” program, threatening assault and arrest to all who resisted.

The Ethiopian government currently plans to relocate 45,000 households in Gambella by 2013. The Human Rights Watch (HRW) alleges that this resettlement program is part of a plan to relocate 1.5 million people in Ethiopia in order to lease 3.5 hectares to foreign investors. In the last two years, the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture has rented out more than 350,000 hectares to 24 investors for large-scale commercial agricultural operations.

Land Grabs and Deforestation in South Sudan

[Cross-linked at Bertelsmann Stiftung - Future Challenges' blog]

According to a report issued by the Oakland Institute, hedge fund land grabs in Africa are a contributing factor to “food insecurity, the displacement of small farmers, conflict, environmental devastation, water loss and the further impoverishment and political instability of African nations.”

The implications of land deals in the Republic of South Sudan are particularly troubling in the light of the fledgling nation’s turbulent history and its relations with the Khartoum government. South Sudan was granted autonomy from Khartoum on July 9, 2005, and officially became an independent country on July 9, 2011. However, South Sudan’s autonomy and independence could well be under serious threat from land deals.

In March 2008, Nile Trading and Development Inc (NTD), a Dallas Texas-based company headed by former US ambassador Howard Eugene Douglas, leased 600,000 hectares of land in Mukaya Payam, Lainya county in South Sudan’s Central Equatoria State. The 49 year land lease was bought for 25,000 USD (about 75,000 Sudanese pounds). The lessors were the Mukaya Payam Cooperative, a fictitious cooperative “made up of influential natives from Mukaya Payam and other neighboring payams (districts)” and the contract was signed by the Mukaya paramount chief, Scopas Loduwo.

This deal comes to about 0.04 USD per hectare for the duration of the lease and the contract allows for an additional 400,000 hectares to be leased to the company with virtually no limit placed on the use of the land and its resources. The contract reads:

The development, production and/or exploitation of timber/forestry resources, including without limitation, the harvesting of current tree growth, the planting and harvesting of megalopolis-paulownia, palm oil trees and other hardwood trees and the development of wood-based industries; and
Agriculture, including the cultivation of the jetropha [sic] plant and palm oil trees (and the exploitation of any resulting carbon credits).

In reporting this deal, the largest land deal to date in South Sudan, the Guardian pointed out that Nile Trading and Development Inc stands to profit heavily as it gains millions in revenue from UN-backed carbon credits. This is in addition to the profits garnered from the exploitation of the land’s forests and farmland. Once the trees are logged, the land may be reforested or turned into farmland, but the contract also allows NTD to explore and drill for oil and other minerals.

As late as July 26, 2011, the people of Mukaya county refused to give the land to NTD, stating that the paramount chief and other members of the ficticious Mukaya Payam Cooperative did not consult with the community before agreeing to the 49-year land lease. Such a lack of transparency among the most influential members of the Mukaya is a further blow to indigenous land and water rights.

What are the possible environmental effects of this land deal?

The contract allows Nile Trading and Development (NTD) unlimited use and exploitation of the natural resources of the 600,000 hectare plot of land. This includes logging, harvesting palm oil, and mining for oil, all of which could contribute to deforestation and the degradation of the topsoil in South Sudan.

The Great Land Rush: Land Grabs & Food Security

Crosslinked at Bertelsmann Stiftung – Future Challenges Organization

The Great Land Rush and Food Security

What is land?

Many of us don’t think about what land really means. An economist might define land as the totality  of natural resources in a given area, while a lawyer might focus on  land, water and mineral rights. But a farmer’s answer might be simpler: land is the farmer’s capital. Land is the soil and  water utilized in the production of crops for the local or global market. In the context of an increasingly globalized world, land rights are paramount, particularly in the Global South (Asia, South America, Africa and Australia). As governments and multinational corporations buy up land, small farmers and indigenous groups are edged out.

A Global Phenomenon

A 2010 World Bank study showed that 110 million acres (44,515,420.7 hectares) of farmland worldwide were sold or leased in the first eleven months of 2009 alone;  70 percent of these land deals were concentrated in Mali, Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Madagascar and Mozambique.

Before 2008, land was sold or leased at an average annual rate of  10 million acres (4,046,856.42 hectares). However, in the last four years alone, nearly 148 million acres (about 60 million hectares) of land on the continent of Africa has been acquired by international investors and government bodies. This surge in land grabbing and speculation deserves attention because it poses a grave threat to regional food security, indigenous land and water rights.

These land deals are not just confined to the continent of Africa (which holds nearly two-thirds of the world’s remaining arable land). In the Middle East,  Bahrain has seen political upheaval and protest in the wake of a major land deal within its borders. White South African farmers are buying up land in Georgia while in the Ukraine, the state is planning to buy up 30 percent of the nation’s land to bolster the country’s food security. In Australia, in a similar move a Chinese company has offered to buy 80,000 hectares of farmland.

In one of Asia‘s poorest nations, 15 percent of Cambodian land has been signed over to private companies (made easier by the Khmer Rouge’s  prohibition of private property and subsequent burning of all land titles). In South America, the Brazilian government has shown its openness to greater foreign investment in rural land. In today’s globalized world economy, these land deals have far-reaching effects.

Why the rush for land?

Factors driving the land grab include population pressure, the burgeoning middle class in the Global South and its heightened demand for foodstuffs, in concert with individual countries’ concerns over food security. As ready access to food is essential to a politically stable nation, food security can have major political effects.

This was seen in 2009 in Madagascar when a land deal with a South Korean conglomerate that would have handed over half of Madagascar‘s arable land was met with mass protests and led to the overthrow of then-President Ravalomanana.

Remittances to Drought/Famine-Affected Households in Northern Kenya

[Cross-linked at Bertelsmann Stiftung - Future Challenges' blog]

Women and children are the ones most susceptible to the effects of drought and famine which is why it is important to consider ways to make remittances more accessible to them. Kenya already has the infrastructure and services to lower the cost of sending money to relatives who need monetary assistance. Of course, money is not the answer to poverty just like food is not the answer to hunger.

Poverty is more than the lack of money. Poverty is not merely the antithesis of prosperity, it’s the result of systemic and structural inequalities as well as inequality on an individual, relational level. Africa, a continent rich in mineral wealth and human capital, is impoverished insofar as inequality persists. It is beset by structural problems like the lack of supportive infrastructures that would enable the success of small businesses, administration, roads, buildings, schools and accessible, affordable healthcare. With this in mind, money is not the answer to poverty, food insecurity and socioeconomic inequality.

In Kenya, mobile technology has changed the way that remittances are sent to relatives. Kenyans were using airtime to send money to relatives before the launch of M-PESA. Before Safaricom and the British Department of International Development collaborated to launch M-PESA in March 2007, Kenyans would take their money to a cellphone shop, buy scratchcards for airtime, and send the code numbers to their relatives via text messages. Recipients of the code would then either use the airtime or give the code to the shopkeeper at the cellphone store who would give them cash. This ingenuous method was a direct challenge to banks and the wire transfer companies.

M-PESA is an SMS-based money transfer system that allows users to deposit, transfer and withdraw money on their cell phones. The M stands for Mobile, and “PESA” is Swahili for “money.” The service was used by up to 38 percent of Kenya’s adult population within two years of its launch.

“Cash Back”: Diaspora Remittances to Somalia

[Cross-linked at Future Challenges - Bertelsmann Stiftung's Blog]

As of May 2011, annual remittances to the continent of Africa exceeded 40 billion US dollars. According to the World Bank, remittances to sub-Saharan Africa totaled 21.5 billion USD. “Cash backs” from emigrants to the Global South have become essential to local economies. In the case of Somalia, it began in the 1970s when ever more Somalis went to the Middle East to work and started sending high-value consumer goods back home which could be sold for cash. Others used a system known locally as ‘Cadeyn,’ transferring their salaries via Somali traders, who, in turn, used the foreign currency to buy consumer goods for import into Somalia and then paid the worker’s relatives in Somali shillings after selling the goods.

However, as technologies improved and the financial sector and telecommunications industry intermeshed, money transfers became more formalized. Somalis abroad switched from sending goods and money by way of traders, and began deploying money transfers via satellite phones in the early 1990s. Diaspora remittances have become more important to Somalis since Somalia’s political and economic collapse. After the 1991 overthrow of President Mohammed Siyad Barre, and the subsequent descent into civil war, Somalis have became increasingly dependent on remittances from Somalis abroad.

Today, 812,700 Somalis live abroad or 8.7 percent of Somalia’s population. Many emigrate from Somalia to Ethiopia, the United Kingdom, the United States, Yemen, Djibouti, Kenya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Canada and Sweden. The World Bank currently does not have information on remittances to Somalia, but it is clear that a significant percentage of Somalia’s 9.4 million people rely on remitted monies from relatives abroad.

“Cash Back:” Remittances from the African Diaspora

[Cross-linked at Bertelsmann Stiftung - Future Challenges Organization's blog]

The African diaspora is comprised of over 30 million emigrants from Africa‘s 54 nations. The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) estimates that each year the African diaspora contributes about 40 billion USD in the form of remittances to their families and communities. Between 1960 and 2003, the continent of Africa received over 600 billion USD in aid, but diaspora remittances were double that sum in the same period.

From a macroeconomic standpoint, diaspora remittances account for a significant percentage of some African nations‘ gross domestic products (GDPs). For example, in 2006, remittances to Uganda totaled 845 million USD or 9.3 percent of the GDP. Between 2006 and 2010, remittances from Ugandans living abroad increased by a staggering 235% to about 2 billion USD. This comprises about 4.76 percent of Uganda‘s current GDP, according to International Monetary Fund (IMF) data. In 2010, Lesotho was the largest recipient of remittances in terms of GDP, with money transfers accounting for 28.5 percent of GDP. Click here for this working paper on “Determinants and Macroeconomic Impact ofRemittances in Sub-Saharan Africa” which provides more useful information.

While the cost of sending money back home has decreased due to increased competition and new technologies, it still remains relatively high.

Article: What Do Côte D’Ivoire’s Displaced Populations Face?

[Cross-linked at Future Challenges Organization]

Macrotrends: [Migration + Pandemics + Globalization + Security & Anti-Terror Policy]

According to the United Nations, the conflict in Côte D‘Ivoire has displaced an estimated one million Ivorians. This is the aftermath of the November 28th election. Allasane Ouatarra is recognized by both the United Nations and the African Union as the winner, but the incumbent President, Laurent Gbagbo refuses to cede power, alleging voter fraud. The climate has devolved into one of violence. On 3 March, 2011, six women were shot by the Ivorian government‘s forces while peacefully participating in an all-women protest against Gbagbo‘s continued rule. On 17 March, 2011, pro-Gbagbo forces fired mortars into a market in the Abobo region of Abidjan, killing between twenty-five and thirty, injuring at least sixty. Residents in Abidjan‘s shantytowns live in fear of being harassed by militias claiming to be looking for Pro-Outtara „rebels.“

The events in Abidjan are a microcosm of the conflict in the country as a whole. Côte D‘Ivoire is flanked by Ghana to the east and Liberia to the west. The fighting has displaced an estimated 4 percent of the nation‘s population- about 100,000 of whom are fleeing westward to Liberia. There are also significant, untold numbers of Ivorian refugees fleeing eastward across the Ivorian-Ghanaian border. Estimates from the Ghana Refugee Board suggest that, as of early March, about 2,000 Ivorian refugees have fled to Ghana.

Liberia is recovering from a 14-year civil war that ended in 2003. Liberian orphans and child soldiers still remain a vulnerable group.

Article: Diaspora Remittances to Africa: The Donor’s Perspective

[Crosslinked with Future Challenges Organization]

Diaspora aid has surpassed international aid on the continent of Africa. I‘d like to propose that we view aid from international and supranational bodies like the World Bank, United Nations, etc as a supplemental source of monies. Africa does not need the paternalistic and self-serving aid of neo-liberal governing bodies. Between 1960 and 2003, the continent of Africa has received over $600 billion in aid. Estimates from the World Bank indicate that remittances by the Africa Diaspora have continued to grow over time, with roughly US$30 billion remitted in 2007. This amount is more than double the amount of international aid received. In 2010, Nigeria‘s diaspora remittances totaled $12 billion.  The overarching trend is that diaspora remittances are increasing, despite the global economic downturn and global food price inflation.

According to the World Bank, in 2006, remittances to Kenya were roughly  $525 million, or the equivalent of 2.2 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Between 2006 and 2010, Kenya‘s annual remittances  increased nearly 300%. Kenyans living abroad sent home $1.9 billion in the past 12 months, more than triple the amount previously estimated by the World Bank.

Remittances to Uganda in 2006 were $845 million, or 9.3 percent of the GDP. Uganda‘s remittances increased from $845 million to about $2 billion between 2006 and 2010. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) has reported that remittances from Zimbabweans living abroad increased 32.9 percent in 2010 to about $263.3 million. Rwanda‘s remittances hit $172.4 million in 2010, rising 23.3 percent despite the global recession. On the other hand, Tanzania, a formerly closed nation, receives much lower levels of remittances, both in real terms ($16 million) and as a percentage of GDP (0.1 %). For nations like Uganda, Nigeria or Zimbabwe, remittances make up a significant percentage of the gross domestic product.  What‘s more important is the recipients‘ perspective. These remittances offer the advantages of allowing children to remain in school, providing the seed capital for small businesses and covering the costs of basic medical care.

Possible Hindrances to Diaspora Remittances

There are several factors that may be a hindrance to sustained growth in diaspora remittances. Among these are prohibitive bank account transfer fees. Also, Western Union‘s fee for wire transfers can be up to 20 percent of the remitted monies. However, it must be noted that reducing the transfer fees is detrimental to African money transfer business. A possible partnership between Western Union and MTN Group would lower money transfer costs on the continent of Africa. Also, Western Union can work cooperatively with African money transfer businesses.

Another factor is inflation in North America & Europe; increase in commodity prices affect how much money members of the African diaspora can send back. A possible but unlikely solution is for nations like France, UK and the US to make these remittances tax decuctible. However, on a macroeconomic scale, inflation is a global issue. The interdependence of currency markets alone highlights the extent to which our world is globalized.

The growth in diaspora remittances over the last decade bode very well for the recipient families and the communities in which they invest those funds. Similarly, the fact that children whose families receive remittances from relatives abroad are able to stay in school longer is heartening. While highlighting the positive, we also have to cast our gaze upon the possible challenges. Diaspora remittances are essential to the growth of Africa- especially on a microeconomic scale. Therefore, it is important to address any hindrances to the sustained growth of diaspora remittances to Africa.

Article: The Global Food Crisis & Land Grabs in Africa

[Crosslinked at Future Challenges Organization: Article: The Global Food Crisis and Land Grabs in Africa ]

Land grabs on the continent of Africa are partly driven by recent food crises, which led to food riots all over the globe.  Currently, Africa has about a third of the world‘s arable land.  Long-term land leases and purchases of Africa‘s arable land are increasing as a response to the global food crisis. The implication is that the creation of commercial food plantations on the continent of Africa will not facilitate mutually beneficial arrangements between African nations and people and the multinational corporations that are buying up the land.

The global food crisis is exacerbated by the fact that unsustainable consumption patterns exist in North America and Europe (the „West“). Moreover, it is telling that the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is pushing Monsanto‘s genetically modified seeds toward African farmers, touting increased productivity, while ignoring their detrimental effects.

„Using strains of crops that required fertilizer, pesticides and irrigation, the Green Revolution methods increased yields. But they also damaged the environment, favored wealthier farmers and left some poorer ones deeper in debt.“ (Seattle Times: Gates Foundation’s agriculture aid a hard sell, 20 January 2008)

The fact remains that much of the land in North America and Europe is not arable because of unsustainable farming practices. These practices include the use of Monsanto’s GMO, single-yield seeds and the cultivation of non-native or invasive species, which essentially strip the soil of essential nutrients. Urbanization and suburbanization is another factor in the decrease in arable land tracts in North America and Europe.

A World Bank study released in September tallied farmland deals covering at least 110 million acres — the size of California and West Virginia combined — announced during the first 11 months of 2009 alone. Over 70% of these land deals are concentrated in Mali, Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Madagascar and Mozambique. These deals usually stipulate the transfer of land ownersship to investors or long-term leases. (NYTimes: African Farmers Losing Land to Investors, 21 December 2010) Before 2008, the average rate was 10 million acres per year. This 1000 per cent increase in land deals is due, in part, to the global food crisis. Governments and multinational corporations buy the land to havegreater control over food prices and production.

In 2009, a land deal with a South Korean conglomerate that would have handed over half of Madagascar‘s arable land was met with mass protests and led to the overthrow of President Ravalomanana. The unpopular former president was replaced by his opposition leader, the former mayor of Antanarivo, Andry Rajoelina.

In Mali, nearly three million acres along the Niger River and its inland delta are controlled by a state-run trust called the Office du Niger. Multinational corporations from China and South Africa are investing heavily into Malian land for the cultivation of sugar cane.  Corporations based in Libya and Saudi Arabia are investing in land for the cultivation of rice. Other nations with heavy investment into African landgrabs includeCanada, Belgium, France, South Korea, India, the Netherlands and multinational organizations like the West African Development Bank.  One problem, for example, is that the Libyan government intends to import its agricultural products (rice, beef, etc.) produced on Malian land into Libya, rather than sell in local markets. This would be good news if the land deals weren‘t displacing Malian farmers. As Mali is still largely agrarian, displaced farmers face a dilemma.  By and large, they do not have the option to migrate to urban centers in search of work. Similarly, they do not have the choice to remain on the land that they tilled for generations.

Here is a map diagramming the buyers and sellers of Africa‘s arable land.

Will this have a disproportionate impact on women?

Traditionally, farming is the domain of women – especially subsistence farming. In some parts of Africa, the cultivation of certain crops, like yams and millet, is gendered. It is estimated that in Burkina Faso, women account for 48 per cent of laborers in the agricultural sector. In Zimbabwe, women comprise 61 per cent of farmers and 70 per cent of the labor force in the agricultural sector.  It makes sense to frame landgrabs as a threat to women farmers‘ autonomy.

As commercial food plantations replace smaller-scale farmers, the concentration of land wealth will place African women at a further disadvantage. Globally, women only own one per cent of land, despite accounting for about 66 per cent of all labor [household, agricultural, etc.]  In Uganda, only 7 per cent of women own land. In Kenya, customary land laws still bar women from owning land.  Senegalese law stipulates that men and women have equal rights to land ownership, but the reality is that economic discrepancies still favor men. It is fair to assert that poverty has a feminine face – and this is particularly true for Africa‘s women.

Land disenfranchisement through land grabs and forced migration from rural-agrarian communities have particularly detrimental effects on women. The majority of Africa‘s farmers are women. The creation of commercial food plantations, the increased concentration of land wealth, and the exportation of foodstuffs produced on African soil will likely have a deleterious impact on emerging economies on the continent of Africa, as well as on the people.