In the Face of a Receding Lake, Water Conflict at the Ethiopia-Kenya Border

Cross-linked with Bertelsmann Stiftung – Future Challenges Organization’s site

Lake Turkana. Credit: Wikimedia.org

In May 2012, the Kenyan government sent 200 additional reserve troops to the Kenya-Ethiopia border in response to Ethiopian militia attacks in the Turkana region. Tensions were high following the killing of a Kenyan police reservist at the hands of Ethiopian militiamen.

This occurs less than a year and a half after Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki and former (now-deceased) Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s May 2011 meeting in Uganda, where they decided to end border conflicts amicably. In addition to water conflicts, there is the conflict of claims over the Elemi Triangle, which is the northwestern corner of Lake Turkana, bordering South Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya.

As I previously addressed in an article entitled “Water Scarcity and Conflict at the Ethiopia-Kenya Border,” water shortages have been contributing to tribal clashes between the Kenyan Turkana and the Ethiopian Dassanech, Nyangatom and Mursi tribes.

In the Horn of Africa, where regional temperatures have risen 2 degrees Fahrenheit since 1960, and are projected to increase an additional 2-5 degrees by 2060, climate change is particularly salient. The effects of this climate change: increasing variability of rainfall,deforestation and land degradation are all occurring within the context of rapid population growth and limited land and water resources.

An estimated eight million semi-nomadic people in Southern Ethiopia and Northern Kenya depend on the waters of Lake Turkana for their livelihoods. Lake Turkana gets 90 percent of its water from the Omo River, but in recent years, the lake has been receding into Kenya.

The conflict is further exacerbated by the diversion of the Omo River’s flow to Ethiopia’s upstream dams (including Gilgel Gibe III), considered the largest hydro-power project south of the Sahara. While providing electricity to Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda and Yemen, the dams threaten the livelihoods of nearly a million nomadic, pastoral tribesmen.

The question at this point is, “are we going to see a repeat of previous events?” In the first week of May 2011, fighting at the Kenyan-Ethiopian border claimed 34 lives. This, in addition to what Steven Watson alluded to in his lead article “Liquid Asset”- the disincentivizing effect of food aid and the perceived price of water, makes it clear that the price of water is high. However, our attitudes toward water use often do not reflect this:

“The moment international agencies give out food, there’s no incentive for the local population to help themselves,” he says. “I worked for some time in the Turkana desert in Kenya where that was very evident. As long as somebody else gives out food there’s no reason to try and provide your own food. It’s a lot of work. Why should you work when you can get it for free? Or take for example the price of water; if water is expensive for you then you will try to use it as efficiently as you can and minimize losses. However if you get the water free as is the case in a very large number of developing countries then there’s no real incentive to use it efficiently.”

Furthermore, in the late 1970s, the Kenyan government’s policy of arming the Turkana was followed within a decade by the Ethiopian government’s arming of Dassanech tribesmen with

Why Invisible Child’s #Kony2012 Campaign Gets No Applause From Me

In short: #Kony2012 #StopKony misrepresents N. Uganda, spreads misinformation abt Kony/the LRA, denies Africans’ agency and is imperialist. It raises the perennial question of “Who represents Africa?”

For example: This tweet (one of many prime examples) succinctly exemplifies all that I critique in this piece:

In fact, it reminded me of my post-colonial readings of Karl Marx. Reading this quote from his “The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: “Sie können sich nicht vertreten, sie müssen vertreten werden” spurred me deeper into my anti-colonialist, post-colonialist fervor. Literally translated from German, “Those who cannot represent themselves must themselves be represented,” the quote revealed to me just how insidious the narrative of “saving” and “speaking for” the subaltern is.

HOW DOES THIS TIE INTO Invisible Children’s #Kony2012 CAMPAIGN?

If “awareness” is the payoff for paternalistic, imperialist, “white man’s burden” NGO campaigns, I don’t want it. (Just the name “Invisible Children” denies and co-opts the agency of Ugandans- many of whom have organized to protect child soldiers…). I stand by this: if you’re more comfortable talking about Africans than you are talking to an African person, you really should not be in the business of representing Africa. Furthermore, if you cannot find an African nation on a map, let alone acknowledge Africans’ agency, you should not be providing “solutions” or “aid. Certainly, if you think that Uganda is in Central Africa, you should not be disseminating (mis)information that could have implications on policy.

Presumably, this campaign is supposed to raise awareness in the international community of Joseph Kony and lead to his arrest and/or death. The assumption is that taking down the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army will eliminate the problems. Thing is, Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army are symptoms of corrupt governance. Invisible Children’s video strangely omits Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni’s complicity in the horrors of the conflict that began in the late 1980s in Northern Uganda at the beginning of his (prolonged) presidency. Clearly, the international justice community is aware of Joseph Kony, because his name has been on top of the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s “most wanted” list for nearly a decade. Not to mention the fact that the United States armed forces have made several attempts at fighting the LRA and killing Joseph Kony, all of which resulted in the displacement of Sudanese and Congolese civilians as the LRA scattered about Central Africa.

[Also, I suggest a little light research into Invisible Children's spending practices.]

Forcible Resettlement and Land Grabs in Ethiopia

Cross-linked at Bertelsmann Stiftung – Future Challenges Organization’s Blog

Ethiopia is Africa’s biggest aid recipient, and one of Africa’s most food-insecure nations. Simultaneously, Ethiopia is one of most militarized nations on the continent, with a history of both internal and external uses of force.

More recently, the forcible resettlement of semi-nomadic groups in the western Gambella region has troubling implications for a nation with high rates of malnutrition and food insecurity, whose citizens overwhelmingly rely upon small-scale farming.

In Ethiopia, the average cost in USD for leasing a hectare for year ranged from $1.25 to $10 before 2009, increasing to $26-$42. While urbanization is changing the population makeup, land deals are still salient for the 83 percent of Ethiopians who are rural dwellers. The increased use of Ethiopian land for biofuel diverts land from food production which is especially important for a country that has consistently been Africa‘s biggest recipient of food aid.

As more Ethiopians become dependent upon the global food market, they also become more vulnerable to fluctuations in prices. Food prices in Ethiopia have recently shot up 50 percent, while the Ethiopian Birr has been devalued in light of the nation’s import-oriented economy. This is in addition to the fact that when food prices spiked in 2008, 6.4 million Ethiopians became dependent upon emergency food aid (this number had dropped to 4.9 million by 2009). Taken together, these factors pose a grave threat to the food security of a nation already dependent upon food aid.

While 10% or Ethiopia’s mostly-rural population (or 7.8 million) is dependent upon food aid, the government has forcibly resettled 70,000 semi-nomadic people (many of whom belong to the Nuer and Anuak tribal groups, the latter of which has faced a history of violence and discrimination in their ancestral homeland) in the western Gambella region as part of a “villagization” program, threatening assault and arrest to all who resisted.

The Ethiopian government currently plans to relocate 45,000 households in Gambella by 2013. The Human Rights Watch (HRW) alleges that this resettlement program is part of a plan to relocate 1.5 million people in Ethiopia in order to lease 3.5 hectares to foreign investors. In the last two years, the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture has rented out more than 350,000 hectares to 24 investors for large-scale commercial agricultural operations.

The Greater WE: Military Interventions in a Globalized World

Cross-linked at Bertelsmann Stiftung- Future Challenges’ blog

Global governance and the movement toward a Greater WE means a protection of global public goods, supranational structures and the harmonization of laws and procedures regarding human rights, trade and security. The Greater WE is about the common good of all, not the profit of a few.

“With this in mind, where do undeclared proxy wars over resources fit into this framework of global governance?”

These military interventions have become a peculiar form of aid that destroys infrastructure, creates dependence and vulnerability. Furthermore, in the case of nations like Somalia, wars and military interventions undermine regional food security, contributing to famine. Considering these factors, it is apparent that security within a global governance framework needs to be reconfigured to address and prevent the resultant destabilization wrought by military interventions.

The overlap of global governance and military might is easily seen when one looks at the United States’ foreign policy. Undeclared wars, interventions and military aid are hallmarks of the Washington’s strategies. For example, the United States is increasing its military presence on the African continent- most pointedly in resource-rich nations like Nigeria, Somalia and Uganda.

What are the implications of President Obama’s decision to send military advisers to Uganda, South Sudan, Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo? Can we learn from the United States armed forces’ forays into Africa? Can we look at the First (1993) and Second (2006) Battles of Mogadishu (Somalia) and Operation Lightning Thunder (2008) and learn from the resultant civilian casualties, displacement and heightened risk of hunger and famine?

Land Grabs and Deforestation in South Sudan

[Cross-linked at Bertelsmann Stiftung - Future Challenges' blog]

According to a report issued by the Oakland Institute, hedge fund land grabs in Africa are a contributing factor to “food insecurity, the displacement of small farmers, conflict, environmental devastation, water loss and the further impoverishment and political instability of African nations.”

The implications of land deals in the Republic of South Sudan are particularly troubling in the light of the fledgling nation’s turbulent history and its relations with the Khartoum government. South Sudan was granted autonomy from Khartoum on July 9, 2005, and officially became an independent country on July 9, 2011. However, South Sudan’s autonomy and independence could well be under serious threat from land deals.

In March 2008, Nile Trading and Development Inc (NTD), a Dallas Texas-based company headed by former US ambassador Howard Eugene Douglas, leased 600,000 hectares of land in Mukaya Payam, Lainya county in South Sudan’s Central Equatoria State. The 49 year land lease was bought for 25,000 USD (about 75,000 Sudanese pounds). The lessors were the Mukaya Payam Cooperative, a fictitious cooperative “made up of influential natives from Mukaya Payam and other neighboring payams (districts)” and the contract was signed by the Mukaya paramount chief, Scopas Loduwo.

This deal comes to about 0.04 USD per hectare for the duration of the lease and the contract allows for an additional 400,000 hectares to be leased to the company with virtually no limit placed on the use of the land and its resources. The contract reads:

The development, production and/or exploitation of timber/forestry resources, including without limitation, the harvesting of current tree growth, the planting and harvesting of megalopolis-paulownia, palm oil trees and other hardwood trees and the development of wood-based industries; and
Agriculture, including the cultivation of the jetropha [sic] plant and palm oil trees (and the exploitation of any resulting carbon credits).

In reporting this deal, the largest land deal to date in South Sudan, the Guardian pointed out that Nile Trading and Development Inc stands to profit heavily as it gains millions in revenue from UN-backed carbon credits. This is in addition to the profits garnered from the exploitation of the land’s forests and farmland. Once the trees are logged, the land may be reforested or turned into farmland, but the contract also allows NTD to explore and drill for oil and other minerals.

As late as July 26, 2011, the people of Mukaya county refused to give the land to NTD, stating that the paramount chief and other members of the ficticious Mukaya Payam Cooperative did not consult with the community before agreeing to the 49-year land lease. Such a lack of transparency among the most influential members of the Mukaya is a further blow to indigenous land and water rights.

What are the possible environmental effects of this land deal?

The contract allows Nile Trading and Development (NTD) unlimited use and exploitation of the natural resources of the 600,000 hectare plot of land. This includes logging, harvesting palm oil, and mining for oil, all of which could contribute to deforestation and the degradation of the topsoil in South Sudan.

The Great Land Rush: Land Grabs & Food Security

Crosslinked at Bertelsmann Stiftung – Future Challenges Organization

The Great Land Rush and Food Security

What is land?

Many of us don’t think about what land really means. An economist might define land as the totality  of natural resources in a given area, while a lawyer might focus on  land, water and mineral rights. But a farmer’s answer might be simpler: land is the farmer’s capital. Land is the soil and  water utilized in the production of crops for the local or global market. In the context of an increasingly globalized world, land rights are paramount, particularly in the Global South (Asia, South America, Africa and Australia). As governments and multinational corporations buy up land, small farmers and indigenous groups are edged out.

A Global Phenomenon

A 2010 World Bank study showed that 110 million acres (44,515,420.7 hectares) of farmland worldwide were sold or leased in the first eleven months of 2009 alone;  70 percent of these land deals were concentrated in Mali, Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Madagascar and Mozambique.

Before 2008, land was sold or leased at an average annual rate of  10 million acres (4,046,856.42 hectares). However, in the last four years alone, nearly 148 million acres (about 60 million hectares) of land on the continent of Africa has been acquired by international investors and government bodies. This surge in land grabbing and speculation deserves attention because it poses a grave threat to regional food security, indigenous land and water rights.

These land deals are not just confined to the continent of Africa (which holds nearly two-thirds of the world’s remaining arable land). In the Middle East,  Bahrain has seen political upheaval and protest in the wake of a major land deal within its borders. White South African farmers are buying up land in Georgia while in the Ukraine, the state is planning to buy up 30 percent of the nation’s land to bolster the country’s food security. In Australia, in a similar move a Chinese company has offered to buy 80,000 hectares of farmland.

In one of Asia‘s poorest nations, 15 percent of Cambodian land has been signed over to private companies (made easier by the Khmer Rouge’s  prohibition of private property and subsequent burning of all land titles). In South America, the Brazilian government has shown its openness to greater foreign investment in rural land. In today’s globalized world economy, these land deals have far-reaching effects.

Why the rush for land?

Factors driving the land grab include population pressure, the burgeoning middle class in the Global South and its heightened demand for foodstuffs, in concert with individual countries’ concerns over food security. As ready access to food is essential to a politically stable nation, food security can have major political effects.

This was seen in 2009 in Madagascar when a land deal with a South Korean conglomerate that would have handed over half of Madagascar‘s arable land was met with mass protests and led to the overthrow of then-President Ravalomanana.

Remittances to Drought/Famine-Affected Households in Northern Kenya

[Cross-linked at Bertelsmann Stiftung - Future Challenges' blog]

Women and children are the ones most susceptible to the effects of drought and famine which is why it is important to consider ways to make remittances more accessible to them. Kenya already has the infrastructure and services to lower the cost of sending money to relatives who need monetary assistance. Of course, money is not the answer to poverty just like food is not the answer to hunger.

Poverty is more than the lack of money. Poverty is not merely the antithesis of prosperity, it’s the result of systemic and structural inequalities as well as inequality on an individual, relational level. Africa, a continent rich in mineral wealth and human capital, is impoverished insofar as inequality persists. It is beset by structural problems like the lack of supportive infrastructures that would enable the success of small businesses, administration, roads, buildings, schools and accessible, affordable healthcare. With this in mind, money is not the answer to poverty, food insecurity and socioeconomic inequality.

In Kenya, mobile technology has changed the way that remittances are sent to relatives. Kenyans were using airtime to send money to relatives before the launch of M-PESA. Before Safaricom and the British Department of International Development collaborated to launch M-PESA in March 2007, Kenyans would take their money to a cellphone shop, buy scratchcards for airtime, and send the code numbers to their relatives via text messages. Recipients of the code would then either use the airtime or give the code to the shopkeeper at the cellphone store who would give them cash. This ingenuous method was a direct challenge to banks and the wire transfer companies.

M-PESA is an SMS-based money transfer system that allows users to deposit, transfer and withdraw money on their cell phones. The M stands for Mobile, and “PESA” is Swahili for “money.” The service was used by up to 38 percent of Kenya’s adult population within two years of its launch.

On Aid: Why Good Intentions Are Not Enough

[Cross-Linked w/ my other blog]

Let’s take the story of a giant, engorged on wealth and privilege. This giant trods upon the earth with greater might and size than his compatriots. He has had the advantages of being able to manipulate a global system that dictates who gets what- even down to potable water, fresh food and life-saving pharmaceuticals. Somewhere in the progression of history, this giant grew to prominence- likely after a world war that left his former rivals indebted to him. He turns his attention to the nations that his rivals colonized- namely those African, Asian and South/Central American nations many of us cannot name.

The giant’s steps invariably crush the voiceless, disempowered and disenfranchised as he drafts documents outlining what a human right is and how to measurepoverty in terms of numbers and indicators. The problem is- those numbers and indicators fail to take into account the most basic of human needs- access to potable water, access to and ability to produce food, access to vital knowledge. Additionally, the assumed universal of “modernization”- a teleological progression from hunter/gatherer to subsistence farmer to an industrial/urbanized society is adopted as a model of “progress.”

So the well-intentioned giant takes it a step further. He introduces Structural Adjustment Plans that require the liberalization, privatization of state-owned enterprises, demonization of labor unions and de-regulation of the “lesser” nations’ governments and economies. He normalizes debt, reduces tariffs, disincentivizes government provision of public goods and undermines the building of taxation structures- in the name of neoliberalism. Meanwhile, multinational corporations threaten the biodiversity of African and Asian ecosystems through intellectual property rights and patents. Claiming plants with medicinal properties and seizing the land on which they grow, these corporations displace the inhabitants of the land, forcing them to move to cities that are urbanizating too quickly to develop the infrastructure that would support the burgeoning urban populations.

In the wake of the destabilizing effects of these myriad policies

Article: What Do Côte D’Ivoire’s Displaced Populations Face?

[Cross-linked at Future Challenges Organization]

Macrotrends: [Migration + Pandemics + Globalization + Security & Anti-Terror Policy]

According to the United Nations, the conflict in Côte D‘Ivoire has displaced an estimated one million Ivorians. This is the aftermath of the November 28th election. Allasane Ouatarra is recognized by both the United Nations and the African Union as the winner, but the incumbent President, Laurent Gbagbo refuses to cede power, alleging voter fraud. The climate has devolved into one of violence. On 3 March, 2011, six women were shot by the Ivorian government‘s forces while peacefully participating in an all-women protest against Gbagbo‘s continued rule. On 17 March, 2011, pro-Gbagbo forces fired mortars into a market in the Abobo region of Abidjan, killing between twenty-five and thirty, injuring at least sixty. Residents in Abidjan‘s shantytowns live in fear of being harassed by militias claiming to be looking for Pro-Outtara „rebels.“

The events in Abidjan are a microcosm of the conflict in the country as a whole. Côte D‘Ivoire is flanked by Ghana to the east and Liberia to the west. The fighting has displaced an estimated 4 percent of the nation‘s population- about 100,000 of whom are fleeing westward to Liberia. There are also significant, untold numbers of Ivorian refugees fleeing eastward across the Ivorian-Ghanaian border. Estimates from the Ghana Refugee Board suggest that, as of early March, about 2,000 Ivorian refugees have fled to Ghana.

Liberia is recovering from a 14-year civil war that ended in 2003. Liberian orphans and child soldiers still remain a vulnerable group.

Article: The Global Food Crisis & Land Grabs in Africa

[Crosslinked at Future Challenges Organization: Article: The Global Food Crisis and Land Grabs in Africa ]

Land grabs on the continent of Africa are partly driven by recent food crises, which led to food riots all over the globe.  Currently, Africa has about a third of the world‘s arable land.  Long-term land leases and purchases of Africa‘s arable land are increasing as a response to the global food crisis. The implication is that the creation of commercial food plantations on the continent of Africa will not facilitate mutually beneficial arrangements between African nations and people and the multinational corporations that are buying up the land.

The global food crisis is exacerbated by the fact that unsustainable consumption patterns exist in North America and Europe (the „West“). Moreover, it is telling that the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is pushing Monsanto‘s genetically modified seeds toward African farmers, touting increased productivity, while ignoring their detrimental effects.

„Using strains of crops that required fertilizer, pesticides and irrigation, the Green Revolution methods increased yields. But they also damaged the environment, favored wealthier farmers and left some poorer ones deeper in debt.“ (Seattle Times: Gates Foundation’s agriculture aid a hard sell, 20 January 2008)

The fact remains that much of the land in North America and Europe is not arable because of unsustainable farming practices. These practices include the use of Monsanto’s GMO, single-yield seeds and the cultivation of non-native or invasive species, which essentially strip the soil of essential nutrients. Urbanization and suburbanization is another factor in the decrease in arable land tracts in North America and Europe.

A World Bank study released in September tallied farmland deals covering at least 110 million acres — the size of California and West Virginia combined — announced during the first 11 months of 2009 alone. Over 70% of these land deals are concentrated in Mali, Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Madagascar and Mozambique. These deals usually stipulate the transfer of land ownersship to investors or long-term leases. (NYTimes: African Farmers Losing Land to Investors, 21 December 2010) Before 2008, the average rate was 10 million acres per year. This 1000 per cent increase in land deals is due, in part, to the global food crisis. Governments and multinational corporations buy the land to havegreater control over food prices and production.

In 2009, a land deal with a South Korean conglomerate that would have handed over half of Madagascar‘s arable land was met with mass protests and led to the overthrow of President Ravalomanana. The unpopular former president was replaced by his opposition leader, the former mayor of Antanarivo, Andry Rajoelina.

In Mali, nearly three million acres along the Niger River and its inland delta are controlled by a state-run trust called the Office du Niger. Multinational corporations from China and South Africa are investing heavily into Malian land for the cultivation of sugar cane.  Corporations based in Libya and Saudi Arabia are investing in land for the cultivation of rice. Other nations with heavy investment into African landgrabs includeCanada, Belgium, France, South Korea, India, the Netherlands and multinational organizations like the West African Development Bank.  One problem, for example, is that the Libyan government intends to import its agricultural products (rice, beef, etc.) produced on Malian land into Libya, rather than sell in local markets. This would be good news if the land deals weren‘t displacing Malian farmers. As Mali is still largely agrarian, displaced farmers face a dilemma.  By and large, they do not have the option to migrate to urban centers in search of work. Similarly, they do not have the choice to remain on the land that they tilled for generations.

Here is a map diagramming the buyers and sellers of Africa‘s arable land.

Will this have a disproportionate impact on women?

Traditionally, farming is the domain of women – especially subsistence farming. In some parts of Africa, the cultivation of certain crops, like yams and millet, is gendered. It is estimated that in Burkina Faso, women account for 48 per cent of laborers in the agricultural sector. In Zimbabwe, women comprise 61 per cent of farmers and 70 per cent of the labor force in the agricultural sector.  It makes sense to frame landgrabs as a threat to women farmers‘ autonomy.

As commercial food plantations replace smaller-scale farmers, the concentration of land wealth will place African women at a further disadvantage. Globally, women only own one per cent of land, despite accounting for about 66 per cent of all labor [household, agricultural, etc.]  In Uganda, only 7 per cent of women own land. In Kenya, customary land laws still bar women from owning land.  Senegalese law stipulates that men and women have equal rights to land ownership, but the reality is that economic discrepancies still favor men. It is fair to assert that poverty has a feminine face – and this is particularly true for Africa‘s women.

Land disenfranchisement through land grabs and forced migration from rural-agrarian communities have particularly detrimental effects on women. The majority of Africa‘s farmers are women. The creation of commercial food plantations, the increased concentration of land wealth, and the exportation of foodstuffs produced on African soil will likely have a deleterious impact on emerging economies on the continent of Africa, as well as on the people.