THE PROBLEM WITH THE DISCOURSE OF ‘TRAFFICKERS’ AND ‘VICTIMS’: Heroes, Villains, and Victims

I say that trafficking prevention is about addressing social inequities, and not about targeting or demonizing traffickers, because in order to do the latter, one needs a “victim” and an “aggressor.” This irradiates the conditions that make trafficking a viable means of income for traffickers and make victims of trafficking vulnerable to coercion and exploitation. The construction of “victims” and “aggressors” in the discourse of trafficking is unhelpful, and it only neglects a fuller analysis of the social conditions and material realities that the trafficker and trafficked grapple with. This is an analog of the “good guys/Heroes” “bad guys/Anti-Heroes” “damsel in distress” narrative that characterizes the Western story-telling tradition.

Am I saying that there are no victims? No. To the contrary, I am saying that this popular narrative among anti-trafficking activists, lobbyists, feminists, and the like facilitates a re-victimizing of survivors of trafficking in synchrony with the demonizing of traffickers. The impetus to ‘save’ victims of trafficking is not an impetus to recognize the agency of survivors and traffickers. By representing traffickers as ‘exceptional’ figures- notably in the classist, racialized trope of the “pimp,” anti-trafficking discourse occludes the truth that traffickers are often those closest to the victim. In many cases, traffickers are parents, family members, intimate partners, neighbors, teachers, religious leaders, police officers, and other ‘trusted’ authority figures. The trafficker is not simply the shadowy figure in the alley who ‘snatches’ runaways or migrants.

The popular discourse trafficking tends to center on women and girls as victims, conflating sex trafficking w the sex trade while displacing the majority of trafficking cases- domestic/forced labor/organ trafficking. This same discourse also facilitates an uneven gaze upon the gendered (and often, racialized) bodies of sex workers via inflated reports of sex trafficking. The “Rescue Industry” enacts this through the surveillance and policing of sex workers, and their subsequent arrest and entry into cycles of recidivism through ‘brothel raids.’ These ‘brothel raids’ typically traumatize and criminalize sex workers and survivors of sex trafficking, most of whom are cis-women and transwomen.

Even “End the Demand” efforts targeting ‘Johns’ unwittingly target and criminalize sex workers- particularly transwomen in the sex industry. ‘Johns’ are assumed to be heterosexual, cis-gender (or “male-bodied”)* men. These assumptions of heteronormativity are dangerous, however, as they doubly criminalize transwomen. One example is the Chicago Police Department’s practice of posting the mugshots of of ‘Johns’ who were arrested and charged with soliciting online in order to ‘shame’ them. Thing is, researchers at DePaul University found that 10 percent of the photos are of transwomen (likely sex workers) who were misgendered as men by police officers and arrested as “johns.”

The “White Savior” impetus manifests itself frequently in anti-trafficking organizations representations of themselves. For example, one organization tellingly named “Saving Innocence” offers would-be anti-trafficking activists a chance to “buy her freedom.” Yes, they propose that anti-trafficking activists fuel trafficking in order to save the ‘exceptional’ victim. Who is this ‘exceptional victim?’ She is typically a cis-gendered Eastern European girl or woman with blond hair, pale skin, and blue eyes. She is “innocence” unlike ‘presumably ‘hypersexual’ African-descended or Latina women who are trafficked into the sex industry. Orientalism rears its head in the anti-trafficking discourse when the ‘victim’ is an Asian woman or girl. A good example is Nick Kristof’s January 2004 column where he reported on ‘buying’ two Cambodian girls’ freedom for $353. He positions himself as a benevolent White Savior gracing the lives of poor trafficked Cambodian girls. He never questions that he fuels the human trafficking industry by ‘saving’ these victims that he’s deemed exceptional. He never questions the gross inequality between the himself and these girls. He never questions his complicity in trafficking. Instead, he silences the girls and tells their story in his typical self-aggrandizing manner.

READING SUGGESTIONS

• Melissa Gira Grant: The War on Sex Workers: An Unholy Alliance of Feminists, Cops, and Conservatives Hurts Women in the Name of Defending Their Rights
• Petra Östergren http://www.petraostergren.com/pages.aspx?r_id=47601
• Laura Augustin http://www.lauraagustin.com/
• Jo Deozema http://t.co/yp2Nrn7t  (citation: Jo Doezema.  Loose Women or Lost Women?: The re-emergence of the myth of ‘white slavery’ in contemporary discourses of ‘trafficking in women’ International Studies Convention, Washington, DC, February 16 – 20, 1999, Gender Issues, Vol. 18, no. 1, Winter 2000, pp. 23-50.)
• In terms of statistical data re: #trafficking, the best source is the Int’l Labour Org (ILO) http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/migrant/areas/trafficking.htm …
• Also, the US Dept. of Justice has case studies of#trafficking. You can search: http://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/human_trafficking.htm …

* I avoid using “male-bodied” or “female-bodied” because it is extremely problematic terminology. The terms themselves do not capture the reality that sex is assigned and ascribed, not innate.

According to the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Article 3(a), trafficking in persons is defined thusly:

“Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the  giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a  person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs;”

In sum, trafficking is the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, receipt of persons for the purpose of exploitation. In this chain of acts, all participants are traffickers.

In legal terms, trafficking in persons is broken down into 3 parts: 1) Action 2) Means 3) Purpose. Action is the actual act of trafficking. Means is the ‘how’ of trafficking. Finally, the purpose (mens rea) of trafficking is exploitation. In order to establish a legal case, lawyers must prove all 3. Action and means are typically easier to prove than purpose, which is highly circumstantial.

In practice, trafficking is complicated. The legal definition says “transportation,” but not all trafficking victims are transported. Understandings of trafficking that hinge on “transportation” will tend to conflate smuggling with trafficking. Smuggling is defined in the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime as:

“the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident;”

What separates smuggling from trafficking is the absence of exploitation. Smuggling becomes trafficking when, for example, smugglers demand higher fees after bringing migrants to a transit or destination country, thereby forcing migrants into a situation of debt peonage or debt bondage.

WHAT FORMS DOES TRAFFICKING TAKE?

Trafficking takes on many forms in many sectors.

• illegal (transnational) adoption
• sexual exploitation
• coerced labor in agriculture, the service industry, domestic work, construction, sports, and so on.
• child brides
• recruitment of children into armed conflict
• forced begging
• removal of organs

Human trafficking worldwide is very complex. Trafficking overlaps with traditional forms of slavery, and often follows historical migration and trade routes and newer migration and trade routes. In other words, human trafficking is a problem internally, regionally, and internationally. In West and Central Africa, trafficking is recognized as a problem in 70% of nations in the respective regions. In East and Southern Africa, trafficking is recognized as a problem in a third of the countries. In West and North Africa, the trafficking of Africans into Europe is a problem exacerbated by pressures exerted by forces of globalization, which drive capital flow northward, and correspondingly, drive eurocentric migration.

Traditional slavery manifests in Northern Ghana and parts of Togo, when young girls are „donated“ to priests and are forced to live as ‚wives‘ and submit sexually to the shrine priests in return for the protection of the families.“ (15, „Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Woman and Children, in Africa“, UNICEF Innocenti Research Center) In central and western Africa, impoverished families (especially in the face of food insecurity- as seen in Niger in the past year, where a famine meant increased attention on child brides) might marry their young daughters off to much older men- subjecting them to destitution, abandonment through divorce. In Kenya and Ethiopia, girls who are married off at a young age are a runaway risk- many of whom end up in urban centers like Addis Ababa, Mombasa, and Nairobi where trafficking in the sex industry is a known problem.  The risks of sex work- sexually transmitted diseases/infections, increased likelihood of abuse- only exacerbate the vulnerability of these young women.

In Northern Tanzania, the mining industry (tanzanite and gold) drives demand for human trafficking.  Additionally, the mines drive demand for the sex trade in their vicinities, which is answered in turn by active recruitment among young women with the promise of fast cash.  Just recently, Bloomberg published a story highlighting the gross abuses and violence in the mines of Tanzania.  In Ghana, the 10th biggest exporter of gold, thousands of children are forced to work in the dangerous mines. Similarly, debt bondage and sex slavery occur in proximity to these mines. In response, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) have formed the The Anti-Human Trafficking and Child Protection Coalition and launched projects such as their Community Resistance to Slavery and Forced Labor (CRSFL), which helps vulnerable communities “organize and create community-based action plans to eradicate slavery.”  The project offers miners alternative means of revenue, via economic assistance intended to foster economic self-sufficiency and autonomy.

It is useful to talk about trafficking in terms of push and pull factors. What would make the child of a smallholder farmer in Niger vulnerable to trafficking? What drives their parents’ decision to enter into an uneven contracts with distant family members or acquaintances that stipulate sending their child away to be an apprentice for a small business owner? Push factors could include:

• Climate change [desertification, flooding, etc] and the resultant displacement of subsistence farmers and pastoral groups
• Poor management of natural resources
• Land dispossession
• Poverty [e.g. the increased reliance upon cash economies and the global food market makes low-income households vulnerable to price-induced food security]
• Low wages
• Social marginalization [e.g. the transnational trafficking of stateless Rohingya people (who originate from Burma) into Malaysia by Thai police and army officers]
• Lack of opportunities in home communities

Pull factors include:

• Perceived opportunity elsewhere

I am hesitant to address the pull factors of trafficking, because, then I risk the appearance of victim-blaming or contradicting the definition of trafficking as being coerced. Persons who are trafficked are indeed lured into coercive situations. Recruiters, in the form of modeling scouts, sports scouts, labor recruiters for temp agencies, even religious leaders, who make promises that appeal to the trafficking victim’s sense of lack. They might promise opportunities to earn money, pursue their studies or become famous. Here is where trafficking prevention would step in. Trafficking prevention should be about addressing social inequities, and not about targeting or demonizing traffickers.

Cross-linked at Bertelsmann Stiftung – Future Challenges’ site

In the year 2005, Africa’s youth unemployment was at 21 percent, much higher than the world average of 14.4 percent and second only to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region’s 25.6 percent.

Today, AiD launches its online platform: http://africansinthediaspora.org/

“Africans in the Diaspora (AiD) envisions a self-reliant, socially and economically just Africa. Through our Funds, Connections, and Voices programs, we unleash the financial, social, and intellectual capital of Africans to advance social and economic change in Africa.”

What’s not to love? An initiative that allows members of the African Diaspora to invest their social, financial and intellectual capital for social and economic change on the continent?

Best of all, if you don’t know where to begin, or you’re a skeptic, there are resources to address your concerns. My concern is always whether African-led initiatives at the community level are being supported. So much of the glamor around large international NGOs and aid agencies puts organizations like Physicians for Social Justice (in rural Northern Nigeria) in shadow.

If you are a Diasporan who wants to give back, Africans in the Diaspora is here to help you. The online platform provides information about local projects and organizations on the continent, and makes it easier to connect with them as a supporter. After all, we do not need to re-invent the wheel- the wheel is already rolling quietly at the community level, in the shadows of bigger international NGOs. Africans are at the forefront of development here, and Africans are the funders, designers, implementers and supporters.
Check it out! I am excited about the future of Diaspora mobilization and engagement on the continent of Africa.

Twitter: twitter.com/aidinnovations
Facebook: Africans in the Diaspora (AiD)
TUMBLR: http://africansinthediaspora.tumblr.com/
Website: africansinthediaspora.org

Indigenous peoples and resource exploitation. Who wins, who loses, how is the game played, how should it be played?

When one lands in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, it is immediately apparent how resource-rich this country is. The silk cotton trees greeted us with their verdant lushness and the patchwork terrain of high rises and densely-populated residential areas occupied my thoughts as the plane completed its descent.

It’s easy to get caught up in the potential, the unrealized dream of equitable development, but we cannot. Yes, it is true that Equatorial Guinea’s GDP has increased from about 1 million USD in 1968 to 14 billion USD in 2010 (World Bank, 2012). But where does this wealth come from? Equatorial Guinea is heavily dependent on oil. According to the African Economic Outlook report, 78 percent of the nation’s GDP is derived from the exploitation of its oil reserves. The fact remains that Equatorial Guinea has the highest GDP per capita on the continent (about 19,300 USD in 2011, a near 2100% increase from 940 USD in 1998).

However, Equatorial Guinea’s population of just under 700,000 has yet to partake in this wealth. This disparity is seen in terms of healthcare. The population makeup, in terms of age, looks like a bell curve – as “Equatoguineans” aged 0-5 and 65 and up are a small percentage of the population. The United Nations (UN) estimates that about 20 percent of Equatoguinean children die before reaching age 5.

The reasons for this include high infant mortality, relatively short life expectancies and all of these are underpinned by developmental issues such as access to healthcare and food security. While Equatoguinean state officials boasted investments in health, pointing to La Paz hospital in the government complex of Sipopo, life expectancies and population makeup in terms of age tells a different story. That investment has not necessarily translated to access.

The contrast between President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo and his appointees’ (including his son’s) lives and the lives of Equatoguineans in rural and urban centers cannot be ignored. The state-run channel plays footage of the President speaking atAfrican Union meetings in his role as President of the AU, alternating between footage of state officials speaking in conference halls. Pictures of President Obiang grace the halls of hotels, conference halls and government buildings, almost exhorting us to accept the representations over what we see with our own discerning eyes.

Resource exploitation in post-colonial states means the disruption of pre-existing land claims in indigenous communities. It also means the influx and flight of capital, as the economy retains the complimentary, export-based orientation of its colonial days. Furthermore, the effects of the “resource curse” rests more heavily upon the people than it does on the government.

Section XX of Equatorial Guinea’s 2006 Hydrocarbons Law, requires local content utilization of 35 percent. This means that, in the manufacturing of goods, corporations must use local goods. In spite of this, the oil sector, which accounts for 78 percent of the nation’s GDP, only employs 4 percent of the nation’s workers, while projections show that from 2010 to 2020, between 25 000 and 49 000 young Equatoguineans will enter the labour market each year.

What does this mean when sectors outside of oil are very small? Can indigenous people win the ‘game’ of resource exploitation?

In May 2012, the Kenyan government sent 200 additional reserve troops to the Kenya-Ethiopia border in response to Ethiopian militia attacks in the Turkana region. Tensions were high following the killing of a Kenyan police reservist at the hands of Ethiopian militiamen.

This occurs less than a year and a half after Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki and former (now-deceased) Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s May 2011 meeting in Uganda, where they decided to end border conflicts amicably. In addition to water conflicts, there is the conflict of claims over the Elemi Triangle, which is the northwestern corner of Lake Turkana, bordering South Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya.

As I previously addressed in an article entitled “Water Scarcity and Conflict at the Ethiopia-Kenya Border,” water shortages have been contributing to tribal clashes between the Kenyan Turkana and the Ethiopian Dassanech, Nyangatom and Mursi tribes.

In the Horn of Africa, where regional temperatures have risen 2 degrees Fahrenheit since 1960, and are projected to increase an additional 2-5 degrees by 2060, climate change is particularly salient. The effects of this climate change: increasing variability of rainfall,deforestation and land degradation are all occurring within the context of rapid population growth and limited land and water resources.

An estimated eight million semi-nomadic people in Southern Ethiopia and Northern Kenya depend on the waters of Lake Turkana for their livelihoods. Lake Turkana gets 90 percent of its water from the Omo River, but in recent years, the lake has been receding into Kenya.

The conflict is further exacerbated by the diversion of the Omo River’s flow to Ethiopia’s upstream dams (including Gilgel Gibe III), considered the largest hydro-power project south of the Sahara. While providing electricity to Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda and Yemen, the dams threaten the livelihoods of nearly a million nomadic, pastoral tribesmen.

The question at this point is, “are we going to see a repeat of previous events?” In the first week of May 2011, fighting at the Kenyan-Ethiopian border claimed 34 lives. This, in addition to what Steven Watson alluded to in his lead article “Liquid Asset”- the disincentivizing effect of food aid and the perceived price of water, makes it clear that the price of water is high. However, our attitudes toward water use often do not reflect this:

“The moment international agencies give out food, there’s no incentive for the local population to help themselves,” he says. “I worked for some time in the Turkana desert in Kenya where that was very evident. As long as somebody else gives out food there’s no reason to try and provide your own food. It’s a lot of work. Why should you work when you can get it for free? Or take for example the price of water; if water is expensive for you then you will try to use it as efficiently as you can and minimize losses. However if you get the water free as is the case in a very large number of developing countries then there’s no real incentive to use it efficiently.”

Furthermore, in the late 1970s, the Kenyan government’s policy of arming the Turkana was followed within a decade by the Ethiopian government’s arming of Dassanech tribesmen with Kalashnikov automatic rifles.

As poor irrigation practices, dams and evaporation due to temperature increases cause the waters of Lake Turkana to recede into Kenya, will it become increasingly urgent for us to find solutions for sharing and conserving our natural resources?

Namib Desert, photographed by Scott A. Christy

The arid nation of Namibia has a newly discovered aquifer called Ohangwena II, that spans its northeast region, which flows under the boundary between Angola and Namibia. The country is considered one of the driest in Sub-Sahara Africa, as it is largely covered by the Namib Desert. This is especially significant because the nation faces further desertification in the face of climate change.

The 800,000 people who live in the area currently depend on a 40-year-old canal that crosses the Namibia-Angola border for their drinking water. The new aquifer could supply water to the residents of Northern Namibia (who comprise 40 percent of the population) for an estimated 400 years. Historically, the scarcity of drinking water sources in the area has limited the scope of development. The discovery of the aquifer Ohangwena II means new opportunities and new challenges.

In response to this discovery, Namibia’s Minister of Agriculture, Water and Forestry announced on July 11, 2012 that his ministry will host a water investment conference in September to bring together the major players in the water sector. This includes the private sector, as financiers and equipment manufacturers would be essential to attracting private investment. Notably absent from the list of attendees are local residents of Northern Namibia.

The opportunity here is ripe. Public-private partnerships can ensure that all Namibians have access to safe water sources. However, the challenge of balancing profit with sustainability looms overhead. GRAIN’s report entitled, “Squeezing Africa Dry: Behind Every Land Grab is a Water Grab” warns of the dangers of privatizing water resources in the context of increasing water scarcity and increased propensity for water conflicts. These dangers are already seen at the Ethiopia-Kenya border and near Ethiopia’s Alwero River in the Gambella region, where deadly conflict brewed over Saudi Star Development Company (owned by Saudi billionaire Mohammed al-Amoudi) diverting water from Alwero River to its plantation.

This is particularly salient in light of the upcoming Namibia Water Investment Conference in Windhoek, from September 12-14. In many instances, land grabs and water grabs are justified under the name of “investment” and the cited benefits range from boosting food security and bringing business to the area. When local and indigenous populations are excluded from the process, investment comes at the expense of regional food security, land rights and water rights, while undermining smallholder farmers’ access to the market and ability to compete.

What Namibia’s government does next in terms of water management and conservation will determine whether it is another story of exploited resources, water conflict and displaced and food insecure populations, or a story of good governance and conservation.

Olympic flag flying outside Eland House in London (CC BY-ND 2.0)

“Do the Olympics highlight “free and fair” competition, or is it just one more scene in which the developing world’s disadvantages are starkly visible?”

This is the question that was on my mind when I watched the Olympic Procession on July 28. Olympiads clad in colorful regalia pranced and strutted beneath their nations’ respective flags. However, there was one group that stood out: the three independent athletes competing under the Olympic flag. At the time, I did not notice the absence of South Sudanese athlete Guor Marial, who could not be in London at the time because of complications due to his lack of a passport.

When I learned of this, it struck me that this is a real disadvantage. Possession of a nationality, a passport and ability to traverse trans-national and international borders are taken for granted by most athletes competing in the Olympics, yet it is a serious consideration for stateless athletes.

The fourth of the 5 “Fundamental Principles of Olympism” (within the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) Charter) states that:

“The practice of sport is a human right. Every individual must have the possibility of practicing sport, without discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic spirit, which requires mutual understanding with a spirit of friendship, solidarity and fair play.”

What, then, does this mean for stateless athletes?

South Sudanese marathon runner Guor Marial will be one of 4 independent athletes competing in the Olympics this year. The remaining three, Philippine van Aanholt, Reginald de Windt, and Lee-Marvin Bonevacia, hail from Curaçao, of the former Netherlands Antilles, dissolved in October 2010. (Eight months following its dissolution, during the June 2011 International Olympic Committee (IOC) Executive Committee session, the Netherlands Antilles’ membership on the Committee was withdrawn.)

Competing as an independent athlete means rather than competing under their nation’s flag, they do so under the Olympic flag. Independent athletes fall under three categories that overlap: those who are stateless, those whose nations do not have Olympic Committees, and those who hail from occupied or colonized states. In Guor Marial’s case, it is a combination of the first two, as South Sudan has hundreds of thousands of stateless inhabitants, and does not have an established Olympics Committee.

In January 2011, the people of South Sudan- at the time, a de facto territory- voted for separation from the Republic of Sudan. Six months later on July 8, 2011, the Republic of South Sudan was an independent state. However, the issue of nationality is still unresolved for many Sudanese and South Sudanese. The April 8, 2012 deadline for residents in southern Sudan to declare their nationality passed, leaving several hundred thousand either stateless or residents of the Republic of Sudan.

This is due, in part, to the August 2011 Sudan Nationality Act passed by the Khartoum government, which declares that Sudanese may have dual citizenship with any state but South Sudan. This is especially salient for youth whose parents are both Sudanese and South Sudanese, as their nationality is based upon the nationality of the parent who holds legal custody.

Guor Marial’s story is one of the complicated ones. Born April 15, 1984 in Panrieng, in what is now South Sudan, he is a survivor of child slavery in Sudan during the Sudanese Civil War, and a former refugee. He came to the U.S. as a refugee from the protracted 39-year Civil War that claimed the lives of eight of his ten siblings, becoming a  permanent resident; however, because he is not a U.S. citizen, nor is he a Sudanese or South Sudanese citizen, he does not have a passport. As such, he cannot compete for Sudan, South Sudan (which does not yet have an established Olympics Committee), or the United States, in spite of qualifying to compete. Thus, Marial is competing as an independent athlete, and the first stateless Olympiad. In a recent interview with Joshua Kors of Huffington Post, Guor Marial is quoted as saying:

“If I ran for Sudan, I would be betraying my people.. I would be dishonoring the two million people who died for our freedom.”

In a way, the independent athletes represent the nexus of statehood, belonging and citizenship. Guor Marial is hardly an anomaly. In spite of the United Nations’ (UN) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that everyone has a right to a nationality,conservative estimates place the number of stateless people around the world at 12 million people.

Statelessness affects individuals’ access to rights and privileges usually accorded by the state- including, but not limited to secure land tenure and water rights (which tie into rural dwellers’ ability to participate in local markets and bolster regional food security) and the ability to travel across transnational and international borders freely (this particularly affects refugees).

It is with these considerations in mind that I question the notion of the Olympics as a chance for athletes around the world to compete on a level playing field. When one has to jump hurdles even before getting to the race, is the Olympics really a level playing field?
Cross-linked with Bertelsmann Stiftung – Future Challenges’ site

In the Lead Article, entitled “Work in the Developing World,” I stressed the need for policy, partnership and cooperation across the private, non-profit, and public sectors to create jobs.

This applies especially to addressing youth unemployment in the developing world, where in the year 2005, Africa’s youth unemployment reached 21 percent, higher than the world average of 14.4 percent and second only to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region’s 25.6 percent. Furthermore, International Labor Organization (ILO) statistics estimate that young people make up approximately 36.9 percent of the total working-age population.

SAMSource, a U.S.-based non-profit organization is partnering with Techno Brain- a software development company incorporated in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, with offices in 11 countries– to launch an initiative to create jobs in data entry, content moderation and other outsourcing jobs to hundreds of Kenyan youth from low-income households. This initiative, according to SAMSource Chief Operating Officer, Chelsea Cooper, aims to address rising unemployment rates among Kenya’s educated youth.

Lakshman Manickam, Director Operations and Human Resource at Techno Brain was quoted as saying, “The project we are in with SAMSource is about creating jobs to the youth from slums around Nairobi. We target those with IT skills that can help us do certain tasks for American companies.” These American employers include government agencies and corporations, including, but not limited to LinkedIn, Intuit, and the U.S. State Department. Additionally, local hospitals will be employing these skilled youth.

Essentially, SAMSource bids for contracts with employers in the U.S.’ private and public sectors, outsourcing data entry, content moderation and verification and other tech-related jobs to their offices in Nairobi, where youth from the city’s slums will be employed. Similarly, the Rockefeller Foundation has invested 35 million shillings (about 415, 500USD) into a project that aims to employ youth in informal settlements in Kenya, South Africa, and Ghana.

By funding the digitization of the Ear, Nose and Throat clinics at Kenyatta National Hospital’s four million records and awarding the contract to Techno Brain, the Rockefeller Foundation enabled the employment of 35 youth from Kibera and Mathare. As more hospitals and clinics adopt electronic medical records (EMR), there will be a greater need for skilled, computer literate workers.

As I said in the lead article, “it’s not enough for jobs to be created – they must be the right type of jobs, filled by the right type of workers.” Initiatives like these have great potential, as they match employers with contractors, matching jobs with employees. Beyond macroeconomic policy and labor market intervention, there needs to be multi- and cross-sector cooperation, as economic growth is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for lowering unemployment rates among African youth.

Lake Chilwa, Malawi – Credit: Kevin Souza (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0)

Cross-linked on Bertelsmann Stiftung – Future Challenges’ Site

In 2004, Malawi’s population was estimated at 12.3 million with an annual growth rate of 2.1 percent. Malawi is the most densely populated country in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, with a population density of 104 inhabitants per square kilometer. About 83 percent of the total population was rural, and 81% of Malawi’s economically active population was employed in the agricultural sector.

Agriculture contributed 37.6 percent of Malawi’s GDP (1.7 billion USD) in 2003. Agriculture accounts for about 90 percent of the country’s export earnings, of which tobacco comprised for 60 percent.

Malawi’s second-largest lake, Lake Chilwa, located near the Malawi-Mozambique border is shrinking, and not just seasonally. The lake, located in the eastern Zomba District, is about 60 kilometers long and 40 kilometers wide, the lake is surrounded by extensive wetlands. There is a large island in the middle of the lake called Chisi Island.

Possible factors include the climate change and declining soil fertility, which induce farmers to become increasingly dependent upon the lake for irrigation and fluctuations in rainfall levels, which alter the lake’s ecosystem.

Lake Chilwa is a shallow lake which shrinks significantly in the dry season, increasing greatly in volume during the rainy season. The lake is a center of sustenance and commerce, supporting 335 villages with over 60,000 inhabitants who participate in a thriving fishing industry. Additionally, the waters of Lake Chilwa are essential to local agriculture, especially as local farmers adjust to climate change.

The lake has no outlet, and is at risk for drying up if its waters are diverted for human use. The International Association for Great Lakes Research (IAGLR) has found that Lake Chilwa faces overfishing and increased degradation as the number of fishermen increases and as the population practices agriculture around the basin and inside the lake during the dry season. The full report can be found here.

This is salient because Malawi’s farmers overwhelmingly grow mono-cultures, and until recently, corn occupied 90 percent of cultivated land and comprised 54 percent of Malawian caloric intake, as covered in a previous article. However, in response to the global commodities market (cash crops like corn and tobacco saw prices drop, while cotton prices rose), many Malawian farmers switched to cotton mono-cultures, hoping that the profits would compensate for the risk they took in cultivating less corn (again, a dietary staple).

What happened instead is that cotton prices dropped, and many smallholder farmers are grappling with worsening food insecurity. The global price shocks are reverberating far beyond Malawi’s farmers’ profits.

Within context, it is clear that water issues of access, conservation and sustainability are central in developing nations that are more vulnerable to climate change and global price shocks in the commodities market. How, then, do we begin to address these myriad, overlapping issues?